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Abstract 
The perception of watching eyes has been found to reduce dishonest behavior. This effect, 
however, has only been shown in situations where it can be explained by increased adherence 
to rules and norms, and thus a watching-eyes effect on dishonesty per se has not been 
demonstrated. Moreover, the effect has been investigated only with images of watching eyes, 
not in an interactive situation with a live person, which may arguably have different effects 
on behavior. In the present study, the effect of watching eyes on dishonesty was investigated 
with an interactive computer game of lying. Participants played the game against a 
confederate, whom they believed to be another participant. On each trial, they were briefly 
presented with a view of the confederate, after which they chose whether to lie in the game. 
The confederate alternated between the use of direct and downward gaze. The results showed 
that another individual’s direct gaze reduced lying in the game. The findings have 
implications for both everyday and professional situations, such as clinical conversations and 
police interrogations. 
Keywords: eye contact; direct gaze; watching eyes; lying; dishonesty; deception; 
honesty; self-awareness 
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Eye Contact Reduces Lying 
1  Introduction 
The perception of another individual’s direct gaze is known to influence many aspects 
of human emotion, cognition, and behavior (for reviews, see Conty, George, & Hietanen, 
2016; Hietanen, 2018; Kleinke, 1986; Senju & Johnson, 2009). Among other effects, 
another’s direct gaze has been demonstrated to increase honest and prosocial behavior. 
People seem to care about others’ opinion of themselves and, in situations where they are 
being observed by others, they behave in a more socially desirable way (Oda, Niwa, Honma, 
& Hiraishi, 2011). Interestingly, even a mere image of watching eyes seems to act as a 
reminder of such evaluative observance and hence increase positive behavior. Studies have 
demonstrated eye images to increase prosocial behavior, such as helping of others (Manesi, 
Van Lange, & Pollet, 2016) and giving money to charities (Powell, Roberts, & Nettle, 2012), 
and reduce many forms of undesirable behaviors, ranging from minor mischief, like taking 
drinks without paying (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006), to more serious dishonesty, such as 
stealing bicycles (Nettle, Nott, & Bateson, 2012). 
Some researchers have explained the observed results by an increased tendency for 
prosocial behavior, whereas others suggest that increased adherence to norms may better 
explain the effects. For example, in an economic game paradigm, a robust increase in the 
likelihood of donating money by presenting participants with a schematic drawing of 
watching eyes has been repeatedly demonstrated (for a review, see Nettle et al., 2013). 
Importantly, however, in most of these studies, the perception of watching eyes has not been 
found to increase the overall amount of donations, but only the probability of donating. Nettle 
and colleagues (2013) explained this as a heightened awareness of norms and increased 
normative behavior by the perception of others’ observance, as in such economic games, 
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donating something, but not excessively, is likely perceived as the norm. However, not all 
results fit this interpretation. In one study, for example, an eye image was found to increase 
non-normative generosity (charitable donations that were uncommon and not socially 
obligated) suggesting an increase in prosocial behavior in and of itself (Powell et al., 2012). 
In an inventive study, Oda, Kato, and Hiraishi (2015) examined prosocial lying and 
norm adherence and found watching eyes to increase norm adherence and honesty at the cost 
of prosocial behavior. In the experiment, participants rolled a die under a paper cup, checked 
the rolled number privately through a hole in the cup, multiplied the number by a certain 
amount of yen, and reported it on a sheet of paper. The experimenters promised to give a 
corresponding amount of money to charity. Therefore, in this setting, by lying and breaking 
the rules participants were able to give more to charity and thus act more prosocially. The 
results showed that, without an image of watching eyes, participants tended to lie and report 
the numbers as higher than was statistically expected, but in the presence of watching eyes, 
the numbers were reported honestly. This suggests that the primary behavioral effect of 
watching eyes is an increase in honesty and norm adherence, and it occurs even at the 
expense of prosociality. Notably though, in this study and others, which have shown a 
watching-eyes effect on dishonesty (Bateson et al., 2006; Nettle et al., 2012), the observed 
effect can be fully explained by increased norm adherence. Dishonesty, however, is not 
always against prevailing rules or social norms. This may be the case, for example, in telling 
“white lies” or in playing certain games, like poker, where bluffing is an integral part of the 
game. To our knowledge, no study has examined the effect in a setting where the measured 
form of dishonesty is not also a clear rule infringement. Therefore, a reduction in dishonesty 
per se by the perception of watching eyes remains to be demonstrated. 
Overall, studies examining the watching-eyes effect on dishonesty are few and there 
is discrepancy in their results. In one study, the effect was scrutinized in three different 
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experiments that each offered a possibility for economic or social gain by cheating (Cai, 
Huang, Wu, & Kou, 2015). In none of the different settings did the image of watching eyes 
reduce the amount of cheating by participants. The authors attributed the observed null effect 
to the clear anonymity of the situations (the experiments were conducted in separate cubicles 
and all materials were anonymous), which may have reduced the salience of reputational 
concerns. The finding was argued to imply that an eye image does not activate one’s moral 
standards of honesty, and it only alters behavior in situations where others’ opinion of oneself 
may be affected. Similarly, in the studies on the watching-eyes effect on prosocial behavior 
and cooperation, there have been inconsistent results, with some researchers failing to find 
any effect (Carbon & Hesslinger, 2011; Fehr & Schneider, 2010). It seems that further 
research on the behavioral effects of watching eyes is indicated. 
To our knowledge, the effect of another’s gaze direction on actual lying in an 
interaction between two people has not been previously studied. This is rather surprising, as 
one’s own gaze behavior when lying to others has been extensively studied (e.g., DePaulo et 
al., 2003). Although the effect of perceived direct gaze on dishonest behavior has been 
previously investigated, as described above, lying directly to another person is in many ways 
different than the earlier mentioned forms of dishonesty, and we do not know if perceiving 
another person’s direct gaze reduces lying to him or her. In direct lying, the receiving end of 
the dishonesty is much more salient and clearly defined compared to a vague idea of a 
possible sufferer. Knowing who the recipient is has been shown to reduce subsequent lying to 
them (Van Zant & Kray, 2014). In an interactive situation, the recipient is also able to express 
doubts, which may further reduce the inclination for dishonesty. In studies on interaction 
media richness and deception, people have been found to lie more in a video-based 
interaction than in a face-to-face interaction, and even more in a text-based interaction 
(Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008; Zimbler & Feldman, 2011). An experiment that involves an 
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interaction between two people also allows the use of genuine eye contact with a live person 
as a stimulus instead of an image of watching eyes. As described earlier, most previous 
studies on the effect have used eye images. Studies have shown that viewing a real person 
evokes different subjective and neurocognitive reactions in the perceiver than a mere image 
(Hietanen, Leppänen, Peltola, Linna-aho, & Ruuhiala, 2008; Pönkänen, Alhoniemi, 
Leppänen, & Hietanen, 2010; Pönkänen, Peltola, & Hietanen, 2011). Therefore, a live person 
could be expected to have different, probably stronger, effects on one’s subjective experience 
and behavior than a watching-eyes image. Another limitation of most previous studies is that 
they have compared a photo or a schematic picture of watching eyes to a completely different 
kind of image, such as a picture of flowers (e.g., Bateson et al., 2006). Despite this, the effect 
has been attributed to watching eyes and not the mere perception of an eye or a face stimulus, 
which remains a plausible interpretation of the results. Notably though, in one study that 
avoided this pitfall, an image of a direct gaze was found to increase prosocial behavior 
(helping of others) as compared to images of an averted gaze, closed eyes, or flowers (Manesi 
et al., 2016). 
In the present study, the effect of eye contact on lying was investigated by using an 
interactive computer game of lying and catching another’s lie. In the rules of the game, lying 
was acceptable and thus reduced lying could not be attributed to increased adherence to 
norms. Participants played the game against a confederate opponent, whom they believed to 
be another participant. Participants were led to believe that the study was focusing on 
physiological responses to the game. On each game trial, they were briefly presented with a 
view of the opponent through a smart glass window, after which they reported to the 
opponent the color of a circle appearing on the computer screen. Participants were able to lie 
about the color in order to earn more points in the game. The opponent alternated between the 
use of direct and downward gaze in a pseudorandomized order. Lying was expected to be less 
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likely on trials where the opponents directed their gaze towards the participants’ eyes instead 
of gazing downward. 
After the game, participants were asked to complete self-report questionnaires. The 
watching-eyes effect has been attributed to an automatically-triggered feeling of being the 
target of another’s observation, which implies heightened self-awareness (Bateson et al., 
2006). Arguably, this awareness of an outer perspective on one’s self could then induce 
favorable changes in behavior, though studies have not examined whether it mediates the 
effects. In accordance with the idea, however, it has been shown that another individual’s 
direct gaze may increase public self-awareness (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015; Myllyneva, 
Ranta, & Hietanen, 2015) and that heightened self-awareness is associated with increased 
honest and prosocial behavior (Beaman, Klentz, Diener, & Svanum, 1979; Diener & 
Wallbom, 1976; Vallacher & Solodky, 1979; van Bommel, van Prooijen, Elffers, & Van 
Lange, 2012). Thus, in the present study, we also measured self-awareness with a self-report 
scale in both gaze conditions. Heightened public self-awareness was expected in response to 
another’s direct gaze. The effect of watching eyes on lying was expected to be mediated by 
heightened public self-awareness. In addition, to examine the generalizability of lying in the 
game to lying in everyday life, participants completed a self-report scale of lying in the past 
24 hours. A positive correlation between lying in the game and reported lying in the past day 
was expected.  
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2  Method 
2.1  Participants 
Participants were 51 people aged 19–37 years (M = 24.7 years, SD = 4.1, 26 females, 
25 males) recruited from email lists of the University of Tampere and Tampere University of 
Applied Sciences. This sample size exceeded Cohen’s (1992) recommendation for finding a 
moderate effect at .80 power (α = .05). The participants were all native speakers of Finnish 
with no reported history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. In recruitment, participants 
were told that they would be rewarded with a movie ticket or course credit, but if they win 
the game, they would be given another movie ticket. However, as the opponent in the game 
was not a real participant, every participant was rewarded with the extra ticket in addition to 
the participation reward. 
Five participants were excluded from the lying data analysis. Two participants (one 
female, one male) were excluded due to technical problems in the experimental procedure. 
Two female participants were excluded for suspicion of the confederate not being another 
participant. One male was excluded from the analysis due to not lying at all. Additionally, 
one female was excluded from the Lying Frequency Questionnaire analysis due to a technical 
error, which occurred in the beginning of the questionnaire. 
The research protocol was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Tampere region. 
All participants gave their written informed consent. 
2.2  Materials and procedure 
The experiment consisted of three sections: preparations, lying game, and 
questionnaires. The entire experiment lasted approximately one hour. Each participant arrived 
in the laboratory at the same time with a confederate of the same sex. Participants were led to 
believe that the confederate was another participant. During the whole experiment, the 
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confederate behaved like another participant and the experimenter treated the participant and 
the confederate alike. A male experimenter welcomed the two and told them that the 
experiment would be carried out on computers on which an interactive game would be 
played. He told that the study investigates physiological reactions and for that reason two 
electrodes were to be connected to the fingers of one player at a time. A written consent was 
obtained from the participant and the confederate. 
After flipping a coin, the experimenter named the participant as player number one 
and the confederate as player number two and guided them to seats on the opposite sides of a 
black panel separating the room in two. A voltage-sensitive liquid-crystal (LC) shutter 
window (NSG UMU Products Co., Ltd.) measuring 21.5 cm × 38 cm was attached to the 
panel. The state of the LC window (transparent or opaque) was operated by E-Prime 2.0 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA) running on a desktop computer, 
and at first it was set to opaque. The participant and the confederate were seated face to face 
on opposite sides of the LC window. They both had a 19-inch computer screen and a 
keyboard positioned on a table in front of them. The heights of the computer screens were 
such that the players were easily able to see each other over the screens when the window 
was transparent. Participant was seated at a distance of 70 cm from the computer screen and 
80 cm from the LC window. The face of the confederate was at a distance of 70 cm from the 
LC window and 150 cm from the participant. After the participant and the confederate were 
seated, the experimenter demonstrated the function of the LC window by opening it (making 
it transparent) for a moment with the press of a keyboard key. Participant’s and confederate’s 
seat heights were adjusted so that they had their eyes on the same level. 
The experimenter said that, in the game, player one (i.e., the participant) would be 
collecting points first and the physiological measurements would be taken first from him or 
her. He then attached two skin conductance response electrodes (Ag/AgCl) coated with 
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isotonic paste to the palmar surface of the medial phalanges of the index and middle fingers 
on the participant’s left hand. The physiological measurements were carried out only to draw 
participants’ attention away from the actual research question, and for this reason, the skin 
conductance response data were not analyzed. Moreover, due to the trials having many 
successive and overlapping brief events (e.g., animation, sounds, and other stimuli), a reliable 
analysis of skin conductance responses to gaze directions or other events in the game would 
not have been possible. 
Before the game started, the players were both shown a detailed video explaining the 
instructions and the scoring rules of the game and demonstrating them in game situations. 
Lying was explicitly allowed in the instructions (“In order to gain more points, you can at 
times lie about the color”). After the video, the possibility to lie was further emphasized (“If 
you want, you can lie that the blue circle had been red”) along with a summary of all the 
scoring rules (e.g., “If you report that the circle was red, you will gain 1 point” and “If the 
opponent checks the color and catches you in a lie, you will lose 5 points”). The experimenter 
verified that the players had understood the rules. He then announced that during the game he 
would be seated behind a curtain in a separate part of the room and not be able to observe the 
participants, after which he left, and the players began the game. 
In the beginning of each trial of the game, the LC window turned transparent and the 
confederate’s face was presented against a black background for 4400 milliseconds. The 
confederate maintained a neutral facial expression. In half of the trials, the confederate was 
gazing at the participant’s eyes (direct gaze), and in the other half, 20° downward with a 
slight tilt of the head toward the computer screen on his or her side of the panel (averted 
gaze). In order to appear natural, on the direct gaze trials, the confederate raised his or her 
gaze from the computer screen toward the participant shortly (in less than one second) after 
the LC window had turned transparent. The direct and averted gaze trials were presented in a 
EYE CONTACT REDUCES LYING 11 
pseudorandomized order. The confederate received instructions on the gaze condition order 
on the computer screen on his or her side of the LC window. 
 The lying game was adapted from a study by Karton, Palu, Jõks, and Bachmann 
(2014) and run on E-Prime 2.0 software. It was presented on the computer screen in front of 
the participant. As said, each trial started with the presentation of a view of the confederate 
through the LC window for 4400 milliseconds. After 2400 milliseconds from the onset of the 
face stimulus, a two-second animation began on the computer screen. In the animation, 
pictures of a red and a blue circle alternated rapidly. The animation was presented 
simultaneously with the view of the confederate. Then the window turned opaque, the 
animation stopped, and participants were shown either a red or a blue circle on the computer 
screen. They were asked to report the color of the circle to the confederate by pressing left 
arrow (for red) or right arrow (for blue) keys on the keyboard. The confederate’s response to 
the reported color (whether he or she wanted to see what the color had actually been) was 
then shown as a text “Player #2 checks” or “Player #2 does not check” on the computer 
screen. Participants gained 1 point by reporting the color to be red, no points by reporting 
blue, and lost 5 points if caught lying. The confederate lost 3 points if he or she checked the 
color and participant had reported it honestly. Participants were led to believe that the 
confederate made their moves in the game independently, but in actuality, the confederate’s 
moves had been written into the computer program. See Figure 1 for an example of a trial 
sequence. The game consisted of 120 trials, 60 with each color. The game scores of the 
participant and the confederate and the trial number were presented on the right side of the 
computer screen. 
______________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
______________________  
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Participants’ reports of the colors were checked 12 times (6 times in both gaze 
conditions), but only when they had reported the color honestly. Participants had to be 
checked and caught lying an equal number of times in both gaze conditions to avoid biasing 
them into thinking that the risk of being caught were higher after either gaze direction. They 
were not caught lying even once because this enabled each participant to be caught lying for 
the same number of times and equally in both gaze conditions without the exclusion of 
participants. Even a minimum limit of two lies in each gaze condition (with either of the lies 
being checked) could have led to the exclusion of many participants due to too few lies in 
either condition. Moreover, being caught (especially if it happened already on the first lies) 
was presumed to increase the probability of participants restraining from lying altogether, 
which would have been antithetical to the aim of the study. 
After playing 120 trials, the game ended, and questionnaires (control questions, 
Situational Self-Awareness Scale, and Lying Frequency Questionnaire) followed. Participants 
were not yet informed that the game had finished but were led to believe that after the 
questionnaires, the roles in the game would switch and it would be the confederate’s turn to 
collect points. The confederate’s turn to collect points, however, was not played, as it was 
insignificant for the research question. 
Participants were first presented with a control question: “How often do you estimate 
the opponent was looking at you when the window opened and you saw the opponent?” The 
question was answered with a number ranging from 0 to 100 percent. The aim of the control 
question was to exclude participants who had not noticed variation in the gaze direction of 
the confederate (due to, for example, avoiding looking at him or her), thus responding 0 or 
100 percent. 
Participants then completed the Situational Self-Awareness Scale (SSAS; Govern & 
Marsch, 2001) in response to both gaze directions. The window was opened two additional 
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times, and participants filled in the questionnaire after each view of the confederate. The 
SSAS measures three forms of situational awareness: public self-awareness (measured with 
items such as “Right now, I am concerned about the way I present myself”), private self-
awareness (e.g., “Right now, I am conscious of my inner feelings”), and awareness of 
immediate surroundings (e.g., “Right now, I am keenly aware of everything in my 
environment”). Each of the subscales were measured with three items that were answered on 
a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from strong disagreement to strong agreement. The items were 
translated to Finnish and modified so that they referred to the moment of looking at the 
confederate instead of the present moment. The instructions stated that the LC window would 
soon open and after that, the participants would be asked how they were feeling when they 
were looking at the other person. They were then shown all the nine questionnaire items to 
familiarize with them first. A text “The window will open as soon as Player #2 has read his or 
her instructions and pressed a button. Please wait.” was presented, after which the window 
turned transparent for four seconds and participants saw the confederate either looking at 
them or downward. They then completed the questionnaire regarding how they felt when the 
window was open. After this, participants read the same instructions again, saw the 
confederate now looking at the other direction and then completed the questionnaire 
regarding that situation. The order of the gaze directions was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
After the SSAS, participants completed the Lying Frequency Questionnaire (Serota, 
Levine, & Boster, 2010). In the instructions, participants were asked to think back to where 
they were and what they were doing during the past 24 hours and to count how many times 
they had lied in that time. They were instructed to count all lies, big and small. They were 
then asked separately about lies to family members, friends, business contacts, acquaintances, 
and total strangers. For each type of recipient, they were asked separately about lies in face-
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to-face and mediated situations (by phone or in a written message). The instructions and the 
questionnaire items were translated to Finnish. 
Finally, participants were asked to type out their answers to two questions about 
suspicions regarding the study design: “What do you think is the aim of this study?” and “Do 
you think that something was not told about the experiment?” The aim of these questions was 
to assess whether participants had guessed the research question or that the opponent was not 
a real participant, which would have altered their perception of the game and the experiment. 
After the control questions, participants were informed that the game would not 
continue, and the experiment was finished. They were then told about the true nature of the 
study and the reasons for misleading them and given the participation reward along with the 
extra movie ticket. 
3  Results 
3.1  Manipulation and suspicion checks 
A manipulation check question was used to assess whether participants had noticed 
variation in the gaze direction. To the question “How often do you estimate the opponent was 
looking at you when the window opened and you saw the opponent?” participants estimated, 
on average, the proportion of trials with direct gaze to be 60.98 % (SD = 23.42, range = 10–
95). Because all participants reported having noticed that the opponent had, at times, both 
looked at them and away from them, no participant was excluded based on this question. 
Two suspicion check questions were used to assess whether participants guessed the 
research question or the confederate being a research assistant. To the question of the aim of 
the study, no one reported the correct research question and therefore no participant was 
excluded. To the question of thinking that something had not been told about the experiment, 
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two female participants reported having suspected that the opponent was not a real 
participant, and they were excluded from the analysis, as mentioned in the method section. 
3.2  Lying game 
Lying in the game was measured as the number of dishonest responses, or stated more 
specifically, the number of blue circles reported as red. Participants lied, on average, 22.93 
times (SD = 13.51, range = 1–50) on the 60 trials where a blue circle was shown. A paired 
samples t test indicated that participants lied less on trials where the blue circle was preceded 
by direct gaze (M = 10.96, SD = 6.94) than on those where it was preceded by averted gaze 
(M = 11.98, SD = 6.98), t(45) = -2.06, p =.046, d = -0.30. In accordance with the guidelines 
to reduce the risk of a type I error (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), the statistical 
analyses were repeated without any data exclusions and only with the exclusions due to 
technical problems, and in both reruns the effect remained significant (p = .036 and p = .028, 
respectively). 
On average, participants made 0.67 mistakes (SD = 1.56, range = 0–6) of losing a 
point by reporting having seen blue when shown red, presumably due to lapse of attention or 
accidentally pressing the wrong key. The number of mistakes did not differ between the two 
gaze conditions, t(45) = -0.90, p = .37, d = -0.13. 
3.3  Situational self-awareness 
A paired samples t test was conducted to compare the self-awareness ratings on the 
SSAS in response to direct and averted gaze (see Table 1). There was no significant 
difference between the gaze conditions in public self-awareness, t(45) = 1.50, p = .14, d = 
0.22, or in private self-awareness, t(45) = -0.77, p = .45, d = -0.11. However, a significant 
difference was found for awareness of immediate surroundings, t(45) = -2.13, p = .039, d = -
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0.31. Participants reported lower awareness of surroundings in the direct gaze condition (M = 
4.01, SD = 1.52) than in the averted gaze condition (M = 4.27, SD = 1.41). 
Public self-awareness was proposed to mediate the relation between eye contact and 
lying. However, because the predictor (gaze direction) did not have a significant effect on the 
hypothesized mediator (public self-awareness), mediation through public self-awareness was 
not possible (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
______________________ 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
______________________  
3.4  Lying in everyday life 
In the Lying Frequency Questionnaire, participants reported having lied, on average, 
2.49 times (SD = 2.98, range = 0–12) during the last 24 hours. There was a trend of a positive 
correlation between the reported number of lies during the last day and the total number of 
lies in the game, r(45) = .27, p = .079. 
4  Discussion 
The primary aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of another 
individual’s direct gaze on dishonesty. This was achieved by using an interactive computer-
assisted lying game that participants played against a confederate, whom they believed to be 
another participant. On each trial, participants were first briefly presented with a view of the 
confederate, after which they reported to the confederate the color of a circle appearing on the 
computer screen. Depending on the trial, the confederate was gazing either directly at the 
participants’ eyes or downward. Participants were found to lie less on trials where the 
confederate gazed at the participants than on trials where he or she looked downward. There 
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were 8.5 percent fewer lies on the direct gaze than the averted gaze trials corresponding to a 
small-to-medium effect size (d = -0.30). 
This is the first study to demonstrate a watching-eyes effect on dishonesty that cannot 
be explained by increased adherence to rules. Previous studies on this effect have shown 
reductions in dishonest behaviors that have been clear violations to norms and rules, such as 
stealing (Nettle et al., 2012) or lying to experimenters (Oda et al., 2015). Lying, however, is 
not always against the norms and rules, as was the case in the present study. In the present 
study, a reduction in dishonesty was observed in a lying game where occasional dishonesty 
was allowed and expected, and thus arguably normative. Furthermore, in a broader sense, 
most previous findings on the behavioral effects of watching eyes, such as increased 
prosociality, generosity, and normativity, all suggest an increase in cooperative behavior. 
Increased cooperation has been argued to be the primary effect of the watching eyes, having 
its roots in human evolution (Ernest-Jones, Nettle, & Bateson, 2011). In this study, however, 
the reduction in lying in a competitive, head-to-head game can hardly be seen as increased 
cooperation. Therefore, instead of a mere increase in norm adherence or cooperation, the 
present findings demonstrate that watching eyes may reduce dishonesty in and of itself. In 
this sense, the results are novel and broaden the picture of the watching-eyes effects. 
This study is also the first to show the effect of perceived direct gaze on dishonesty by 
using a live person as a stimulus and by measuring dishonesty as lying to that person in an 
interactive situation. Many researchers have argued for the use of truly interactive study 
designs in social cognition research instead of reducing social interaction to its parts and 
investigating these elements in isolation from each other (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, & Gallagher, 
2010; Schilbach et al., 2013). Studies on social cognition typically use passive, spectatorial 
setups where the other person is replaced with an image presented on a computer screen. This 
makes the stimulus presentation more controllable and consistent, but it leads to a situation 
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where the participants are merely observers without a possibility for interaction, thus 
removing important social aspects of the situation. Previous studies have shown a decrease in 
dishonest behavior by the perception of watching-eyes images instead of a live person’s gaze 
(Bateson et al., 2006; Nettle et al., 2012; Oda et al., 2015), and by using a completely 
different kind of image, such as a picture of flowers (e.g., Bateson et al., 2006), as a control 
stimulus. The present study expands on the previous findings by showing that the watching-
eyes effect on dishonesty can be generalized to seeing another individual’s direct gaze in 
natural social interactions, and that it is the perception of direct gaze, not that of a face or 
eyes, that elicits the effect. 
As a secondary goal, the psychological mechanism underlying the effect was 
examined. We hypothesized that public self-awareness, the awareness of an outer perspective 
on one’s self, would be heightened in response to another’s direct gaze and mediate the 
relation between eye contact and reduced lying. Self-awareness was measured with the SSAS 
questionnaire (Govern & Marsch, 2001). Unexpectedly, however, the confederate’s gaze 
direction was not found to affect participants’ ratings of self-awareness on the scale, and, 
consequently, the relation between eye contact and reduced lying could not be mediated by 
self-evaluated public self-awareness. 
The unexpected result may be explained by the use of a self-report questionnaire for 
the measurement of self-awareness. Self-report measures are known to be problematic 
because people may not want to, or not be able to, evaluate and report their own subjective 
states honestly and accurately (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). Self-report measurement of self-
awareness has also lead to inconsistent findings in previous studies. Many studies have 
shown that another individual’s direct gaze can increase self-rated public self-awareness 
(Hietanen et al., 2008; Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015; Myllyneva et al., 2015; Pönkänen et al., 
2011). However, in a recent study by Hietanen and Hietanen (2017), it was not affected by 
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another’s direct gaze, even though in that study, eye contact was found to increase first-
person pronoun use implying heightened self-awareness. Interestingly though, in that study 
and in the present study, participants reported lower awareness of surroundings in response to 
eye contact. Awareness of surroundings is a measure of “non-self-focus” on the SSAS scale 
(Govern & Marsch, 2001, p. 368), and, based on the idea of attention as a bidirectional 
phenomenon focused either on the self or the environment (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), 
Hietanen and Hietanen (2017) proposed that the result reflects heightened self-focus. Given 
the above considerations, on the questions of the self-awareness effect of eye contact or the 
mediation of the honesty effect through self-awareness, the present results do not provide 
compelling evidence in one direction or another. However, the results of this study and 
previous studies do importantly indicate that self-report measures of self-awareness may be 
unreliable. Thus, further research on self-awareness and eye contact using alternative 
methods to self-reports is warranted. 
As an increase in self-awareness was not found to mediate the effect, it is possible that 
some other psychological mechanism could account for it. One such explanation could be 
that eye contact reduces lying because of increased cognitive load, though for reasons related 
to the present study design, it does not seem very likely. Seeing a face with direct gaze may 
impair simultaneous cognitive performance (Conty, Gimmig, Belletier, George, & Huguet, 
2010; Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps, 2005; Glenberg, Schroeder, & Robertson, 1998), and it 
has been shown that increased cognitive load reduces one’s abilities to lie convincingly (Vrij 
et al., 2008). Maintaining eye contact, too, has been shown to impair this ability. In one 
study, requesting participants to maintain eye contact while telling true or false stories was 
found to make it easier for observers to tell when they were lying (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & 
Fisher, 2010). However, a careful inspection of this proposition and the present study design 
reveals that this is not a probable explanation for our findings. Lying is considered 
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cognitively more demanding than telling the truth for several reasons. Lying requires making 
a decision to lie and constructing the lie (Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey 2003). 
When lying, people also tend to monitor and adjust their behavior accordingly in order to 
appear honest (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989), while also observing the recipient’s reaction to 
the lie (Schweitzer, Brodt, & Croson, 2002). In our experiment, however, very little 
construction of a lie was needed, as lying consisted only of pressing one key instead of 
another. Moreover, as the players could only see each other at the beginning of each trial 
before the color of the circle was presented, participants’ decision to lie was not made during 
eye contact, but after it. For the same reason, monitoring one’s behavior to appear honest was 
not needed and observing the recipient for signs of disbelief was not possible. Therefore, it 
seems unlikely that cognitive demands imposed by eye contact would explain the observed 
reduction in lying. Furthermore, because participants found out the color of the circle only 
after the window had been shut, they were not lying or even anticipating lying when the 
confederate saw them. Instead, while the window was open in the red and blue trials, they 
behaved identically. Therefore, the results cannot be explained by participants believing that 
the probability of being caught in a lie would be higher on the direct gaze trials due to the 
opponent seeing their intentions to lie, because of, for example, signs of restlessness or a 
guilty facial expression. 
Another possible explanation is an increase in reputation management by the 
perception of another’s direct gaze. As noted earlier, because lying was allowed in the game, 
the results could not be explained by an increased adherence to rules. Regardless of the rules, 
however, being caught lying is undesirable, and even shameful to most people, and therefore 
lying in the game did carry a certain reputational risk. Already early on in the research of 
watching-eyes effects, heightened concern of reputation was proposed to explain the findings 
(Bateson et al., 2006). This explanation is particularly powerful because, in addition to most 
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results of increased prosocial and normative behavior, it can account for many of the null 
results of previous studies. Often in those studies, no actual reputational costs or gains could 
have been attained by the participants due to obvious anonymity of the situation (Cai et al., 
2015; Fehr & Schneider, 2010; Lamba & Mace, 2010). Reputation management can also 
explain the results by Oda and colleagues (2015) of reduced prosocial lying because prosocial 
lying enabled by the study design could not have improved one’s reputation, whereas being 
caught lying could have damaged it. Regarding the present study, it can be argued that the 
result of no increase in self-rated self-awareness is against this explanation. An increase in 
public self-awareness can indeed be expected with reputational concerns because it refers to 
conscious attention toward the way one is perceived by others (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 
1975), which is largely synonymous with reputation. Reputation management (attempts to 
control others’ impression of oneself), however, may also occur subconsciously without any 
attention to one’s self or self-presentation (Schlenker, 1980). Therefore, an increase in 
reputation management by the perception of another’s gaze remains a plausible, albeit 
speculative, explanation of the present results. 
Additionally, we wanted to examine whether lying in the game was associated with 
lying in day-to-day life. For this purpose, a self-report questionnaire of lying in the past 24 
hours was used. Participants were instructed to carefully think back over the last day and 
count the number of times they had lied to someone. A trend of positive correlation between 
lying in the game and reported lying in the past day was observed. As the same people who 
tend to lie more in their day-to-day life also lied more in the game, the result may indicate 
that there was some perceived similarity between everyday lying and lying in the game. The 
finding gives suggestive support for the external validity of the lying game and the use of this 
kind of games in the measurement of dishonest tendencies. However, as the correlation did 
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not reach statistical significance, the result is only tentative and should be interpreted with 
caution. 
One possible limitation of the present study was that participants were not caught 
lying even a single time. One can argue that, because of this, participants may have 
developed a feeling of invincibility in the game. However, this does not seem likely, because 
such a perception should have increased the rate of lying, and in the present study, the lying 
rate was actually lower than in the study that first introduced the game, where participants 
were occasionally also caught lying (Karton et al., 2014). Moreover, while not being caught 
could have aroused suspicions that the game was rigged, only two participants expressed such 
suspicions, and therefore the predominance of participants did not figure this out. However, 
as noted earlier, being caught lying is likely to induce negative, self-related emotions. It could 
have therefore increased the awareness of one’s self and reputation and the perception of 
another’s direct gaze as distressing or intimidating. These, in turn, could have increased the 
effect of another’s gaze on one’s behavior. Therefore, the observed effects could have been 
different, possibly stronger, if participants had been caught lying at least a few times during 
the game. 
The presented results have practical implications for both everyday and professional 
situations. In Western cultures, people tend to look another person in the eyes when they are 
asking him or her something of particular importance, especially if there is a pronounced 
demand for an honest answer. This may be due to the common conception that avoiding eye 
contact is suspicious or due to heightened attentiveness to the other person (Kleinke, 1986). 
Be that as it may, the present results suggest that, in this kind of situations, the use of eye 
contact may indeed increase the probability for an honest answer. Similarly, the results have 
implications for professional contexts. Much of the research regarding lying and its detection 
has been conducted with a police interrogation context in mind (DePaulo et al., 2003). The 
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present study provides further evidence for the use of eye contact in obtaining an honest 
answer, which may be useful information for professionals in this field. Furthermore, the 
practical implications extend to other professional situations that demand for, or benefit from, 
honesty in an interaction, such as clinical conversations, job interviews, and the like. 
5  Conclusions 
The perception of another individual’s direct gaze was found to reduce subsequent 
lying to him or her. As far as the authors know, this is the first study to demonstrate that the 
perception of watching eyes reduces dishonesty in a setting where the effect cannot be 
explained by increased adherence to rules. The present study also showed, for the first time, 
the watching-eyes effect on dishonesty by having a live person with alternating gaze 
directions as a stimulus and by measuring dishonesty as lying to the other person in an 
interactive situation. No evidence of mediation of the effect through self-awareness was 
obtained. The findings have implications for both everyday and professional situations. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. An example of a trial sequence. The participant first saw the confederate 
opponent through the transparent LC window. Then, the window turned opaque and the 
participant was presented with a red or a blue circle. The participant decided which color to 
report to the opponent, who then decided whether he or she believed it. Finally, the scores 
were updated based on the decision of the opponent.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
SSAS Ratings by Gaze Direction 
 Direct  Averted     
Subscale M SD  M SD t(45) p 95% CI Cohen’s d 
Public 3.21 1.51  2.93 1.51 1.50 .14 [-0.10, 0.66] 0.22 
Private 4.29 1.31  4.37 1.16 -0.77 .45 [-0.29, 0.13] -0.11 
Surroundings 4.01 1.52  4.27 1.41 -2.13 .039 [-0.51, -0.01] -0.31 
Note. CI = confidence interval. 
